Written exclusively for 'HR News & Views':
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
By now you will all be aware of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 which is our way of implementing the EC Equal Treatment Framework Directive. However there has been a development in its application worthy of some comment. That is the recent decision of the European Court of Justice in Coleman –v- Attridge Law. See, even lawyers can get it wrong (in fact they are more likely to than most!). Mrs Coleman had been employed by Attridge Law since January 2001. She is not disabled but is the principal carer for her son who is disabled within the meaning of the DDA 1995. She accepted voluntary redundancy in 2005. She subsequently brought an unfair constructive dismissal claim and further claimed under the DDA alleging harassment and less favourable treatment. These included:
• Being called lazy when she sought to take time off to care for her son;
• Being accused of attempting to manipulate her working conditions;
• That she was refused flexibility in her working hours;
• That her formal grievance complaining of her treatment had not been dealt with properly;
• That abusive and insulting comments had been made about her and her son
Mrs Coleman argued that she had suffered discrimination not because she was disabled but by association with her son’s disability. The Employment Tribunal held that the DDA did not cover such discrimination as the ‘discrimination’ and ‘harassment and discrimination in employment’ definitions in the DDA are designed to protect those who are disabled from discrimination. Nevertheless the Tribunal thought that the Directive suggested that Mrs Coleman’s treatment should be covered. It therefore referred to the ECJ the question:
“Whether the Directive only protects persons who are themselves disabled; If not, whether it protects employees who, although not themselves disabled, are treated less favourably or harassed on the ground of their association with a person who is disabled; and, where an employer treats an employee less favourably or harasses him or her on the ground that he or she cares for a disabled son, whether that treatment is direct discrimination or harassment respectively in breach of the Directive”.
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, a number of member states made submissions before the ECJ to the effect that the Directive can only apply to disabled people and could not be interpreted as applying to people who are not disabled.
The ECJ started out by saying that the objective of the Directive was to combat discrimination on certain specified grounds. The effectiveness of the Directive would be undermined, and its protection greatly reduced, if a Claimant in Mrs Coleman’s situation could not claim direct discrimination. In simple terms it said:
“The fact remains that it is the disability which…….is the ground for the less favourable treatment”.
Given also that Article 2 (3) of the Directive states that harassment is a form of discrimination, protection from harassment must also not be limited to those who were themselves disabled. The ECJ therefore held that associated discrimination was directly protected by the Directive. It is not the type of person who is protected, but the ground of discrimination. To this end, as long as one causatively can show that it is the disability that is the cause of the discrimination it matters not who has the disability.
The case has not yet run its course. It will now return to the Tribunal for the Tribunal to determine whether in fact our DDA (which applies here rather than the Directive) can be read so as to give effect to the Directive. If it can (and it probably will) the Tribunal will then have to decide whether, on the facts of the case, Mrs Coleman was actually discriminated against and harassed by her former employer on the basis of her son’s disability.
So, employers will need to be careful not directly to discriminate or to harass somebody who by reason of their association with another person who has a disability. By implication discrimination by association should also cover sexual orientation, age and religion or belief all of which are also covered by the Equal Treatment Framework Directive as well as disability. That has a far reaching implication for employers and one which the Tribunal in Coleman may be very wary of introducing.
Since writing this article for a seminar Mark and I did, we now have the Appeal Tribunal’s decision in Saini v All Saints Haque Centre and others (24/10/08). In this case the EAT held that harassment on the grounds of religion or belief where the beliefs are those of a third party is unlawful. So now we know where we are going on this point!
Is there then a duty on employers to make reasonable adjustments, such as changes to hours or place of work, or offering additional assistance, to meet the needs of employees who care for disabled people? The ECJ said not, suggesting
“Such measures are designed specifically to facilitate and promote the integration of disabled people into the working environment and, for that reason, can only relate to disabled people”.
Hhmm. It is difficult to reconcile some of the ECJ’s arguments. If it is necessary for an employee carer to be at home in order to meet some particular need of a disabled dependent, how can an employer refuse to adapt the employee’s hours for that purpose without discriminating against the employee? Given that it is the disability that gives rise for the specific care requirement, not to allow that time off would defeat the very basis upon which the ECJ reached its decision.
For now it is ‘watch this space’ on the reasonable adjustment argument.
Jonathon Stokes is Head of Dispute Resolution at local firm, Gordon Brown Associates. He can be contacted on 0191 230 8103, or visit the web site www.gordon-brown.co.uk
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